Re: [RPSEC] rate limiting management traffic, redux

[Mark Handley <mjh@icir.org>]

>On vrijdag, apr 18, 2003, at 00:13 Europe/Amsterdam, Mark Handley wrote:
>
>>> If the management entity is a peer router at the other end of a link,
>>> one might decide that less stringent resync mechanisms are needed, if
>>> one does not assume a MITM attack capability.
>
>> I guess I think you need to assume MITM attack capability.  Routers
>> are quite often peered across LANs, and I wouldn't want to count on an
>> ethernet switch for routing protection.
>
>The question is whether we need to be able to do man in the middle 
>protection at line rate. If a man in the middle needs a real packet for 
>every forged packet, it would be ok for the line cards to let these 
>packets through and let the CPU do the strong crypto to detect this.

That's true. But you've got to be careful in any re-initialization
mechanism to not allow the attacker use a MITM attack to de-sync
genuinely re-initializing peers so they can't communicate further,
while at the same time defending against flooding of the
re-initialization mechanism.

 - Mark

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