On vrijdag, apr 18, 2003, at 00:13 Europe/Amsterdam, Mark Handley wrote:
If the management entity is a peer router at the other end of a link,
one might decide that less stringent resync mechanisms are needed, if
one does not assume a MITM attack capability.
I guess I think you need to assume MITM attack capability. Routers
are quite often peered across LANs, and I wouldn't want to count on an
ethernet switch for routing protection.
The question is whether we need to be able to do man in the middle
protection at line rate. If a man in the middle needs a real packet
for every forged packet, it would be ok for the line cards to let
these packets through and let the CPU do the strong crypto to detect
this.
Yes that is exactly the rationale underlying why it seems to be OK to
not tie the authentication tag to the packet.