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Re: [RPSEC] [secdir] [sidr] Authentication for OSPFv3
- To: "Vishwas Manral" <vishwas.ietf at gmail.com>
- Subject: Re: [RPSEC] [secdir] [sidr] Authentication for OSPFv3
- From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf at mit.edu>
- Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2008 07:00:27 -0400
- Cc: msec at ietf.org, tsvwg at ietf.org, edward.jankiewicz at sri.com, ospf at ietf.org, secdir at MIT.EDU, sidr at ietf.org, rpsec at ietf.org, dward at cisco.com, Sandy Murphy <sandy at tislabs.com>, rcallon at juniper.net
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- In-reply-to: <77ead0ec0809291853t63940339xc826b13cf5515176 at mail.gmail.com> (Vishwas Manral's message of "Tue, 30 Sep 2008 07:23:24 +0530")
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>>>>> "Vishwas" == Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf at gmail.com> writes:
Vishwas> We can also solve the problem similarly by something like
Vishwas> BTNS(ofcourse Multicast part needs to be thought further)
Vishwas> which does not necessarily require any certificate
Vishwas> verification - so we may have unauthenticated IKE SA's
Vishwas> but then all keys for the CHILD_SA from there are
Vishwas> automatically generated.
Let me see if I understand this approach correctly. I want to
interact with OSPF. Somehow there is a group key that is in use on my
link. In order to obtain this key, I exchange in an unauthenticated
BTNS-style exchange with someone, and as a result of that exchange,
obtain the key?
First, who do I perform this exchange with? Anyone who currently holds the key?
Second, what threats does this protect against?
Finally, one of the things we typically desire from BTNS-style
protocols is a way to turn them into higher-infrastructure protocols when the infrastructure is available. Can I do that with your approach? How?
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