Both GDOI (RFC 3547) and
GSAKMP (RFC 4535) are group key management protocols, which is what
OSPFv3 needs. Unfortunately, both assume the existence of a group
controller that plays an important role in distributing keys. In
other
words, the very democratic all-are-equal many-to-many model of OSPF
might find it
difficult to map to the envisioned group security architecture. I
suppose it might be possible to consider the Designated Router as the
group controller, but as the DR is elected, that might be a
difficult fit.
Even if you solve the group key management problem for OSPFv3, you
still
have the difficulty to doing anti-replay in a multicast environment.
Manral presented a draft some years ago to the rpsec working group
about
the crypto vulnerabilities of routing protocols, and concentrated for
OSPFv3 on replay vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, that did not go
anywhere.
Just for fun, I'm adding the routing area ADs and the secdir on
this list.
This is one of those cross-disciplinary concerns that has the right
people
in several different wgs and areas. The more the merrier, right?
The one quibble I have is that the tsvwg probably has little to do
with this
problem - the transport for OSPFv3 is IP, not TCP, and IP is not
the level
of stuff their charter looks at.
(And sorry for the late reply to your messages, I've been mulling
the options.)
--Sandy
--------- In reply to ------------------------
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2008 17:52:07 -0400
From: Ed Jankiewicz <edward.jankiewicz at sri.com>
To: ospf at ietf.org, rpsec at ietf.org, sidr at ietf.org, msec at ietf.org,
tsvwg at ietf.org
Subject: [RPSEC] Authentication for OSPFv3
I am not an active follower of these lists but have a question.
Please
reply off-list directly to ed.jankiewicz at sri.com or copy me if this
triggers relevant discussion on your list.
What (if any) current initiatives are there that would support
automated
key exchange for OSFPv3 authentication? RFC 4552 relies upon pre-
shared
secret keys for generating message digest, but some of my constituents
have issues with manual generation, distribution and configuration of
keys in their IPv6 network deployment. Is any of the current work on
IKE revisions applicable, any work being done in your working
group, or
do you know of any OSPF-specific solution being developed somewhere?
Thanks.
--
Ed Jankiewicz - SRI International
Fort Monmouth Branch Office - IPv6 Research
Supporting DISA Standards Engineering Branch
732-389-1003 or ed.jankiewicz at sri.com
_______________________________________________
RPSEC mailing list
RPSEC at ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rpsec