[RTG-DIR] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-04.txt

"Les Ginsberg (ginsberg)" <ginsberg@cisco.com> Thu, 31 July 2014 06:03 UTC

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From: "Les Ginsberg (ginsberg)" <ginsberg@cisco.com>
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Thread-Topic: RtgDir review: draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-04.txt
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Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 06:03:00 +0000
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Cc: "rtg-dir@ietf.org" <rtg-dir@ietf.org>, "manav@ionosnetworks.com" <manav@ionosnetworks.com>, "draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis@tools.ietf.org>, "zhangdacheng@huawei.com" <zhangdacheng@huawei.com>, "all@tools.ietf.org" <all@tools.ietf.org>, "mjethanandani@gmail.com" <mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Subject: [RTG-DIR] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-04.txt
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Hello,

I have been selected as the Routing Directorate reviewer for this draft. The Routing Directorate seeks to review all routing or routing-related drafts as they pass through IETF last call and IESG review, and sometimes on special request. The purpose of the review is to provide assistance to the Routing ADs. For more information about the Routing Directorate, please see http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/rtg/trac/wiki/RtgDir

Although these comments are primarily for the use of the Routing ADs, it would be helpful if you could consider them along with any other IETF Last Call comments that you receive, and strive to resolve them through discussion or by updating the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-04

Reviewer: Les Ginsberg

Review Date: July 30, 2014

IETF LC End Date: August 12, 2014

Intended Status: Informational



Summary:  This document is basically ready for publication, but has minor editorial issues that should be corrected prior to publication. I also have a minor concern which the authors may want to address.



Major Issues: None



Minor Issues: I am a little surprised that the use of UTC is emphasized as a means of preventing replay attacks. While this is certainly a viable solution what has been more commonly used by a number of other protocols is reserving a portion of the sequence number for a boot count. In fact this is the way that http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06.txt  has chosen. Yet this document chooses to emphasize UTC encoding.



Nits:



1)The affiliation for one of the authors (Manav) is inconsistent in the header vs the authors addresses section.



2)In the Introduction the last sentence of the second paragraph reads:



"Moving the routing protocols to a stronger

   algorithm while using weaker algorithm for BFD would require the

   attacker to bring down BFD in order to bring down the routing

   protocol. "

I think what is meant is that if the BFD authentication algorithm is weaker than that used by the routing protocols it is more likely to be the target of an attack. The phrase "require the attacker..." seems inappropriate.



3)Section 3 last sentence of the penultimate paragraph:



s/reply/replay



4)Section 6 Second paragraph second sentence



s/notion/the notion



Thanx.



   Les