Orange Book was not about OS security alone. It was successfully applied to network components and DBMS systems also. -----Original Message----- From: saag-bounces at mit.edu [mailto:saag-bounces at mit.edu] On Behalf Of Randall Atkinson Sent: Wednesday, February 20, 2008 10:27 AM To: Peter Gutmann Cc: saag at mit.edu Subject: Re: [saag] Algorithms/modes requested by users/customers Earlier, Peter Gutmann wrote: % Politician's Fallacy again: Is FIPS 140 really the best way to spend your % money? If someone has a better proposal, I am very sure that there is a large audience that would love to hear it. (More on this at bottom) % If FIPS 140 is the answer now, why wasn't the Orange Book % the answer then? You are comparing apples to oranges above. FIPS-140 is only about assurance for cryptographic modules. Orange Book (TCSEC) was only about operating system security. The two address different issues. % What about giving the money to (picking a random name) Cigital and % saying "make sure this code is OK"? One needs a process that is as consistent and reproducible as practical -- no human process could ever be 100% consistent and reprodcible -- otherwise implementers will legitimately complain about a non-level playing field. Or were you proposing to setup a monopoly ? FIPS-140 has multiple certification labs in multiple countries evaluating products -- to avoid creating a monopoly. This HAS driven the evaluation costs downwards over time, and it permits implementers the choice to trade more money for less evaluation time. I don't think anyone has claimed FIPS-140 is perfect. The claims (not by me so much as by other folks on the SAAG list) have been that (1) FIPS-140 is better than other extant security evaluations and that (2) so far no serious alternative proposal that looks reasonably better has appeared. If you think that FIPS-140-* is a target-rich environment, then please try to seriously propose something better. I understand NIST and its partners are looking to evolve into FIPS 140-3 from FIPS 140-2. Have you sent them any concrete suggestions for improvement ? I know the folks at NIST are happy to listen to any serious inputs or proposals. Cheers, Ran _______________________________________________ saag mailing list saag at mit.edu http://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/saag
Note Well: Messages sent to this mailing list are the opinions of the senders and do not imply endorsement by the IETF.