Re: [saag] Algorithms/modes requested by users/customers

[Stephen Kent <kent at bbn.com>]

At 12:36 AM +1300 2/21/08, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> mcgrew <mcgrew at cisco.com> writes:
>
> > Winston Churchill said that democracy is the worst form of government, except
> > for all of the others.  I think that the same is true for the FIPS-140
> > cryptomodule validation process ;-)
>
> I think it's more a case of the Politician's Fallacy:
>
> 1. Something must be done.
> 2. This is something.
> 3. This must be done.
>
> It'd be interesting to see a study of the effectiveness in terms of finding
> security and interop problems of:

since I and others have pointed out several times that FIPS 140 eval 
has nothing to do with protocol interoperability, the reference to 
"interoo" above must be viewed purely within the context of crypto 
algorithms and modes thereof.

> A. A FIPS 140 eval.
>
> B. Running the code through Fortify/Coverity/whatever and completing a crypto
>    exchange with a peer (TLS, S/MIME, PGP, whatever the underlying crypto is
>    that's being used).
>
> in particular in terms of return for effort-involved.
>
> Peter.

FIPS 140 encompasses both hardware and software implementations of 
crypto modules. I see its greatest benefits in the context of the 
former. The process described above does not address hardware 
security module eval at all.

Steve