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[saag] Report on the KMART BoF



The Key MAnagement for RouTing protocols (KMART) BOF was Wednesday
afternoon. It's primary goal was to improve mutual understanding
between the Routing and Security Areas on the operational and
protocol realities of routing security, threats against routing
security, and what automated key management is and can do for
you. It succeeded and seemed to presage improved cooperation
between the areas.

A number of excellent presentations were made on requirements,
existing routing security problems and a history of attacks,
operational characteristics of BGP, and key management. The
BoF was well attended and the Routing and Security ADs were there.
Some ISP people came to the mike and told us what problems they
felt were the most pressing to solve. A list of four problems
with link state routing was presented, with no disagreement, in
which it was thought that the first three were reasonably soluble
and the fourth more problematic: (1) weak algorithms, (2) poor
key rollover / lack of key IDs, (3) lack of replay protection,
and (4) multicast security. There was a desire for the Security
Area to revisit RFC 3365 with respect to the routing protocol
environment and for the Routing Area to pursue completion of
some of the authentication work in the pipeline with renewed
vigor. The TCP Authentication Option which is proceeding in
parallel was cited several times.


Donald (co-chair with Acee Lindem)
====================================================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd      +1-508-786-7554 (work)
 Motorola Laboratories
 111 Locke Drive
 Marlborough, MA 01752 USA
 Donald.Eastlake at motorola.com



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