Peter Gutmann wrote: > > Martin Rex <Martin.Rex at sap.com> writes: > > >Microsoft's implementation (which could be the one referred to by > >Larry's implementation) has a silly design flaw in its TLS renogiation, > >and I'm not sure that the previous text is a way to fix it. > > > >It is possible to configure Microsoft IIS in a fashion so that it > >will first perform a TLS handshake with a server-only authentication, > >and after having received the HTTP request, it will re-negotiate and > >ask for a client certificate. > > It's not necessarily a design flaw, AFAIK it's a performance optimisation to > avoid the server having to maintain state/leave a connection open for an > arbitrary amount of time while the user fumbles around with smart cards and > certificates and whatnot. I'm sorry if I have explained myself so badly. I was NOT talking about the closing of the connection while the client is prompting the user for selection of a client certificate. That is actually an extremely appreciated feature of MSIE (the Browser), a point where most other web browsers are broken in that they stall the server in the middle of a TLS handshake for an indefinite amount of time while performing user interaction. I was refering to a design flaw in server-side session caching of Microsoft IIS (the Server) when it is configured to perform renegotiation in order to obtain a client certificate after having seen and evaluated the request. -Martin
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