Hi Lin, Lin Tao escribió:
Hello, Christian, Marcelo and Frank:I agree with Frank's view. Because the forwarding packet is observed in FCFS draft, so the forwarding process is disrupted,
what do you mean by the process is disrupted? could you describe in detail what is the problem you are pointing out?
and the device is vulnerable,
the device is vulnerable to what type of attacks?again could you rpovide some detailed description of the issue that you are raising?
DoS to the SAVI arch is an issue that we need to assess more indetail i agreee.g. savi cache table exhausted,
see the previous disucssions in the ml about DoS attacks and SAVI
the cpu of switch busy, etc.In my opinion, observing the Control Protocol, e.g. DHCP or ND etc, is easy to implement in switch for these protocolhave special characteristic that can be filtered in switch port while the forwarding packet is blocked.
i don't understand what you mean here about the special characteristicdhcp has little or no security so, i am nbot sure how you are planning to prevent the attacks you mentioned before. with plain ND, is even worse imho, unless you use send, but send still retains some of the DoS attack vectors as been previously disucssed in the ml
So, how do you think these protocols solve the issues you raised above? Regards, marcelo
----- Original Message ----- From: "Christian Vogt" <christian.vogt at ericsson.com>To: "Marcelo Bagnulo Braun" <marcelo at it.uc3m.es>; "Frank Xia" <xiayangsong at huawei.com> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi at ietf.org> Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2008 7:28 PM Subject: Re: [savi] Working Group Adoption of Individual SAVI DocumentsMarcelo and Frank -right, we need to think how to deal with this case one obvious option isIt seems to be hard to deal with the following scenarios: 1)A host isauthorized to use a static address, while the host does not connect thenetworkthat since the address is manually configured in the host, it can also be manually included in the SAVI cache, so it knows that has been manually assignedRight. An alternative, more automated solution might be to have the switch perform proxy DAD when a new address is used on a given port. This would enable the switch to determine whether the new address is pre-configured and hence already in use, because the pre-configured host would respond to the switch's Neighbor Solicitation during the proxy DAD procedure. FCFS already uses proxy DAD -- in the Neighbor Unreachability Detection variant -- to prevent attackers from hijacking an address by faking link-layer movements. An obvious optimization to avoid unnecessary proxy DAD is for the switch to listen for non-proxy DAD, and to skip proxy DAD if non-proxy DAD was performed for the same address/port combination. - Christian _______________________________________________ savi mailing list savi at ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
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