[savi] New version of SEND-SAVI draft

Hi,

We have uploaded a new version of the SEND SAVI draft.

The main changes from version -00 are the following:

- Now deployment is perimetrical (with trusted and untrusted ports). Therefore, only border SEND SAVI devices have to check for the validity of a binding.

- The mechanism is described as a state machine

- Bindings are created by making a SEND SAVI devices issue secured NUD NSOL messages with their own addresses.

- SEND Anchors, Certification Path Solicitations/Advertisements… are considered

- A mechanism is provided to protect against DoS attacks by blocking for some time ports from which validation was unsuccessful.

Regards,

Alberto

Title : SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation

Author(s) : M. Bagnulo, A. Garcia-Martinez

Filename : draft-ietf-savi-send-01.txt

Pages : 19

Date : 2009-10-23

This memo describes SEND SAVI, a mechanism to provide source address

validation using the SEND protocol. The proposed mechanism is

intended to complement ingress filtering techniques to provide a

higher granularity on the control of the source addresses used.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-savi-send-01.txt