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Hi, While I was answering to the ‘IKEv2 address
assignment method and SAVI’ mail, I realized that there may be a fundamental
issue with SAVI affecting its interaction with MIPv6 (regardless the way
addresses are obtained from the HA to be assigned to MN). While the HA has a binding for the MN to a CoA, the
HA defends the HoA for the MN with DAD NADVs (if any node performs DAD NSOLs). Either if the HA is a SAVI device or it is just a
node outside the SAVI perimeter, the result would be that SAVI would prevent
hosts connecting through other ports to use the HoA as source address. However, the mechanisms specified in 11.5.4 for
informing the HA that the MN is back in the Home Network is (In RFC 3775, section
11.5.4): The mobile node SHOULD then send a Binding Update to its home agent, to instruct its home agent to no longer intercept or tunnel packets for it. […] The mobile node MUST use its home address as the source address in the Binding Update.
This would not be allowed by default by FCFS SAVI
(and in general, by any reasonable SAVI deployment). Do you think this is a problem? A solution could be to make SAVI devices to just let
pass this type of MIPv6 Binding Update messages. This would make the HA stop
defending the address, and the MN could gain the SAVI binding by the mechanisms
currently defined to support mobility in the L2 network. This still provides good protection: the SAVI binding
is not released until the SAVI device is convinced that the legitimate MN is in
the network, and this (the Binding Update) is protected by IPsec. Hosts not using MIPv6 are not affected, since they
are not going to give up its binding regardless the Binding Update messages that
could issued by attackers. Regards, alberto |
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