[secdir] Security Directorate review of draft-ietf-rmt-flute-revised-10

Dave Cridland <dave.cridland@isode.com> Thu, 11 February 2010 21:32 UTC

Message-Id: <9010.1265924009.626613@puncture>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 21:33:29 +0000
From: Dave Cridland <dave.cridland@isode.com>
To: draft-ietf-rmt-flute-revised.all@tools.ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Security Area Directorate <secdir@ietf.org>
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Subject: [secdir] Security Directorate review of draft-ietf-rmt-flute-revised-10
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I reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's  
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the  
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the  
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat  
these comments just like any other last call comments.

Looking at the extensive, and well structured, security  
considerations suggests to me that the general scope of attacks is  
well documented. Several options are provided in Section 7.2.2, and  
in particular file vs packet level protection seem not to be wholly  
described. (It seems to be suggested in other sections that both are  
needed).

I also note that the document appears to advise that MIME types can  
be deduced from the filename - such deduction has been known to be  
susceptible to damage, and I would further note that in the case of  
many URIs, there is a provided type already available by (possibly  
partial) resolution of the URI.

In general, it's better to discard and replace file extensions based  
on the known media type to avoid the "foo.jpg.pif" cases.

Dave.

[secdir] Security Directorate review of draft-iet… Dave Cridland