[secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-xrblock-rtcp-xr-discard-rle-metrics-05
Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Mon, 24 June 2013 13:38 UTC
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: ietf@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2013 09:37:49 -0400
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Cc: draft-ietf-xrblock-rtcp-xr-discard-rle-metrics.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-xrblock-rtcp-xr-discard-rle-metrics-05
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Please treat these comments as normal last-call comments. I've been asigned as a security directorate reviewer for this draft. This draft specifies a mechanism to indicate which packets were discarded in a RTP stream. for the most part, this doesn't seem to have any security implications, and the text is clear. I do have one concern. Has the WG analyzed implications of providing feedback to an attacker on what specific SRTP packets are discarded? In the past we've run into trouble with security systems that were too verbose in error reporting. As an example, in certain public-key crypto constructions knowing whether a packet produced a decoding error vs a signature error after decryption can provide an attacker generating forged packets valuable information to attack the system. It's quite possible that SRTP doesn't have problems in this regard. I just want to confirm that the analysis has been done.
- [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-xrblock-rtcp… Sam Hartman
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-xrblock-… Varun Singh