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RE: [Sip] II digit & Calling Name
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Henning G. Schulzrinne [mailto:hgs@cs.columbia.edu]
> Sent: Saturday, June 16, 2001 10:19 AM
> To: Jonathan Rosenberg
> Cc: 'Dean Willis'; Romel Khan; sip@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Sip] II digit & Calling Name
>
> >
> > One might also argue that, if you want to allow the network
> to provide and
> > validate a user identity, then you might want the network
> to provide and
> > validate a device identity (i.e., the Contact). This would
> argue for the
> > equivalent of remote-party-id for Contact. To be honest, I
> never understood
> > why we didn't have the header called Auth-From, and now we
> might want to
> > think about Auth-Contact.....
> >
>
> It seems pretty clear that the privacy draft makes rather traditional
> assumptions about the network architecture, for example, that
> the entity
> doing the identity checking is implied and requires no identification.
> However, without cryptographic authentication of the
> verifier, it's not
> clear how useful this whole scheme is outside tightly constrained
> network architectures and rather old-fashioned trust relationships.
I agree that having cryptographic identification of the verifier is a good
thing, as there will definitely be cases where there is not a transitivity
of trust. My point is that the verification can be done for two things - to
verify the user, and to verify the device. In that case, one might imagine
both a Auth-From and Auth-Contact header (same idea as Remote-Party-ID, but
renamed to indicate which information is being provided), both of which
would need to have cryptographic authentication of the verifier.
-Jonathan R.
---
Jonathan D. Rosenberg, Ph.D. 72 Eagle Rock Ave.
Chief Scientist First Floor
dynamicsoft East Hanover, NJ 07936
jdrosen@dynamicsoft.com FAX: (973) 952-5050
http://www.jdrosen.net PHONE: (973) 952-5000
http://www.dynamicsoft.com
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