Re: [Sip] media-security-requirements and lawful intercept

[Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat at cisco.com>]

Dean Willis wrote:
> On Nov 8, 2007, at 4:11 PM, Paul Kyzivat wrote:
>
> > I guess we might have "can't say who you are talking with, but nobody 
> > can listen in". That in itself is of some utility.
> >
> > And maybe with sip identity we have "somebody you trust says you are 
> > talking to X, and nobody can listen in to whoever you are talking to".
>
> Right. But between "all" and "nothing" there's some middle ground: 
> "Nobody who hasn't been authorized to do so by your regulated provider 
> can listen in". This is the middle ground they're asking us to fill in.
>
> Do we want to go there, or is it all-or-nothing?

Well, that is one of the issues isn't it?

I have mixed feelings whether the middle ground is any better and nothing.

So I don't know. But either way, I think these need to be turned into 
meaningful assertions that can be verified.

We have similar situations with callerid. There are a variety of 
mechanisms used to provide info that is presented as "callerid". These 
have a wide range of trustworthiness. I would like to have a way to 
determine the kind of assertion that goes with a callerid when it is 
displayed to me.

	Thanks,
	Paul


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