Re: [Sip] media-security-requirements and lawful intercept

[Dean Willis <dean.willis at softarmor.com>]

On Nov 9, 2007, at 10:40 AM, Ted Hardie wrote:

> I would personally be happy with that result.  I think the  
> engineering problem
> for anyone who believes it *must* apply to C is a hard one:   
> designing a system
> which 1) allows C to intercept encrypted material 2) allows C to  
> present
> unencrypted material to the LI requestor 3) does not require C to  
> ask for
> the keys to every flow to hide the LI (to maintain the privacy of  
> the flows
> not subject to the LI) and 4) does not reveal C's action to A or B.

I don't think C needs to go to that extent. All C can reasonably do  
is ask A and B for the session key. If A and B are not forthcoming, C  
is free to re-negotiate its peering contract between A and B. And  
that's how the business works today.

If we assume that A and C are also regulated operators, then in most  
jurisdictions they're going to have keys for every session, and it's  
up to their regulators to decide what peers they share keys with and  
what peers they don't.

--
Dean


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