Re: [Sip] comments on draft-kupwade-sip-iba-00

[Harsh Kupwade <harsh_smu at yahoo.com>]

What if the trust anchors are not complied into your client? Then verifying a digital signature is not a trivial problem.

 

Cross certificate validation is a challenging issue?

Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com> wrote:

At Wed, 27 Feb 2008 08:59:10 -0800 (PST),
Harsh Kupwade wrote:
>
> [1 ]
> How can we verify a certificate from a random CA? It will definitely
> be a serious threat in the near future.

Uh, that the trust anchors are publicly known and compiled into
your client.


> A malicious KG is equivalent to a malicious CA. A malicious CA
> can also tag a public key to a different user and pose the same
> threat level.

Yes, a malicious CA is bad.
No, a malicious CA is not anywhere near as bad as a malicious KG.
A malicious CA has to mount MITM attacks on all your traffic
in order to decrypt. A malicious KG can passively decrypt.

Again, some people view escrow as a feature, but its simply
not true that the security properties of PKI-based systems
are the same as those IBE-based systems.

-Ekr

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