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Re: [Sip] scope of derive
On Dec 5, 2008, at 3:27 PM, Hadriel Kaplan wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: sip-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:sip-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf
Of Dean
Willis
Sent: Friday, December 05, 2008 12:22 PM
In a third attack scenario, presume the attacker's goal is to
impersonate a caller, such as the infamous "Radio-Show Sarkozy/Palin"
calls.
Here the goal is not necessarily to prevent the call, but to give the
called party some level of comfort as to the authenticity of the
caller's expression of identity.
Indirect return routability checks clearly establish that the calling
party is sufficiently in-control of the expressed identity as to be
able to receive calls directed toward that identity. This is better
than nothing; it can't prove identity, but it greatly decreases the
probability of a random radio DJ being able to make a prank call.
Actually, I would debate that. Derive and other return-routability
checks have the property of: "if I pass then you know I'm good, if I
fail then you know nothing (neither good nor bad)". I would argue
such a property is only useful in voice communications if it passes
and provides a positive/"good" result *frequently*.
Well, if you had previously told me that you should always pass RRC
and then fail, I might assume the caller isn't you.
For example, if the odds of Derive passing is low in general, then
PaliFrom sip-bounces at ietf.org Sat Dec 6 10:07:29 2008
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From: Dean Willis <dean.willis at softarmor.com>
To: Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan at acmepacket.com>
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Cc: "sip at ietf.org" <sip at ietf.org>, Cullen Jennings <fluffy at cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Sip] scope of derive
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On Dec 5, 2008, at 3:27 PM, Hadriel Kaplan wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: sip-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:sip-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf
Of Dean
Willis
Sent: Friday, December 05, 2008 12:22 PM
In a third attack scenario, presume the attacker's goal is to
impersonate a caller, such as the infamous "Radio-Show Sarkozy/Palin"
calls.
Here the goal is not necessarily to prevent the call, but to give the
called party some level of comfort as to the authenticity of the
caller's expression of identity.
Indirect return routability checks clearly establish that the calling
party is sufficiently in-control of the expressed identity as to be
able to receive calls directed toward that identity. This is better
than nothing; it can't prove identity, but it greatly decreases the
probability of a random radio DJ being able to make a prank call.
Actually, I would debate that. Derive and other return-routability
checks have the property of: "if I pass then you know I'm good, if I
fail then you know nothing (neither good nor bad)". I would argue
such a property is only useful in voice communications if it passes
and provides a positive/"good" result *frequently*.
Well, if you had previously told me that you should always pass RRC
and then fail, I might assume the caller isn't you.
For example, if the odds of Derive passing is low in general, then
Palin would n would have had to assume it *was* Sarkozy even if it failed.
Why? Because she assumes it now, with no such checking, and the
odds of this thing passing are low per the supposition.
Therefore, if we feel the odds of a return-routability check
succeeding is low in general, it is NOT the case that: "it greatly
decreases the probability of a random radio DJ being able to make a
prank call."
But in general, you're confounding the second part of my analysis with
the first, so keep reading . . .
--
Dean
_______________________________________________
Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip
This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol
Use sip-implementors at cs.columbia.edu for questions on current sip
Use sipping at ietf.org for new developments on the application of sip
have had to assume it *was* Sarkozy even if it failed.
Why? Because she assumes it now, with no such checking, and the
odds of this thing passing are low per the supposition.
Therefore, if we feel the odds of a return-routability check
succeeding is low in general, it is NOT the case that: "it greatly
decreases the probability of a random radio DJ being able to make a
prank call."
But in general, you're confounding the second part of my analysis with
the first, so keep reading . . .
--
Dean
_______________________________________________
Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip
This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol
Use sip-implementors at cs.columbia.edu for questions on current sip
Use sipping at ietf.org for new developments on the application of sip