Re: [Sip] SIP Dialog Match

["T Satyanarayana-A12694" <satyanarayana.t at motorola.com>]

No, privacy using encryption.

-----Original Message-----
From: Karunesh Sharma [mailto:Karunesh.Sharma at globallogic.com] 
Sent: Monday, August 03, 2009 10:05 PM
To: T Satyanarayana-A12694; Dale Worley
Cc: sip at ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Sip] SIP Dialog Match

Are you talking about *privacy* headers? I fail to understand here how
*privacy* header will help in such cases.

K$
_______________________


-----Original Message-----
From: T Satyanarayana-A12694 [mailto:satyanarayana.t at motorola.com]
Sent: Monday, August 03, 2009 10:02 PM
To: Dale Worley; Karunesh Sharma
Cc: sip at ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Sip] SIP Dialog Match


In short, if some one wants to fake another client, it is possible since
the communication is in clear. If there are security concerns, then
security mechanisms (privacy etc) should be used.

-----Original Message-----
From: sip-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:sip-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Dale Worley
Sent: Monday, August 03, 2009 9:35 PM
To: Karunesh Sharma
Cc: sip at ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Sip] SIP Dialog Match

On Mon, 2009-08-03 at 21:28 +0530, Karunesh Sharma wrote:
> Is this a valid behavior for scenario like 'Call-Forwarding'?

In principle, the responses to a request should almost always come from
the address to which the request was sent.  But that is not usually
enforced, and there may be good reasons why it isn't happening in a
particular instance.

In regard to an observed instance of this behavior, you must first
determine the complete routing of the request in question and the reason
for each routing step.

Dale


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