-----Original Message-----
From: Dean Willis [mailto:dean.willis at softarmor.com]
Sent: 23 October 2008 19:46
To: Elwell, John
Cc: sipping at ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Sipping] Decision needed on final issue with
draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai-07
On Oct 23, 2008, at 9:18 AM, Elwell, John wrote:
I need a decision on one outstanding issue. We previously
agreed that
PAI could be used in any request. We recently agreed to remove
specification of PAI in responses because there is no standardised
means
of authenticating a UAS. Brett Tate pointed out that
likewise there is
no standardised means of authenticating a UAC when it sends
CANCEL or
ACK (these cannot be challenged, and cannot be rejected if
authentication is wrong). I have so far received no further
opinions
on
this. To be consistent I believe we have to make exceptions
of CANCEL
and ACK and say that PAI cannot be used with these methods.
If I receive no objections by 26th October I will update
the draft on
27th.
The problems is that some network architectures DO allow
authentication of both responses and CANCEL/ACK.
PAI is quite widely used in those networks. In fact, it came
to us as
a P-header for use specifically in those networks.
What is probably needed is an applicability statement that explains
the environment in which PAI is usable in "digest authenticable
requests" , and goes on to explain the environment in which PAI is
usable in other requests and responses.
--
Dean