Re: [tcpm] [OPSEC] draft-gont-tcp-security

[Lars Eggert <lars.eggert at nokia.com>]

Hi, Todd,

On 2009-4-14, at 22:21, Todd Glassey wrote:
> Fernando Gont wrote:
> > Lars Eggert wrote:
> > > I agree with Joe that some of the hardening techniques that  
> > > vendors are
> > > implementing come with consequences (make TCP more brittle). To  
> > > me, this
> > > is a *reason* this document should be published via the IETF (i.e.,
> > > TCPM) - we are probably in the best position to correctly evaluate  
> > > and
> > > classify the impact of various hardening techniques. Stack vendors  
> > > have
> > > been putting these mechanisms in to their stacks without clear
> > > specifications and discussions of the potential upsides and  
> > > downsides
> > > that would let them make an educated decision. It seems clear to  
> > > me that
> > > the vendor community is looking for guidance here, and I do  
> > > believe the
> > > IETF should give it.
> >
> > This is the reason for which the output of the CPNI project was
> > submitted as an IETF I-D.
> Yeah - so then this would be tested across all of the local TCP
> implementations including the MS, AT&T *(i.e. Lachman Associates Inc)
> and possibly Mentat's fast system?

Nothing would be "tested", the IETF isn't in the business of auditing  
TCP stacks. What we're talking about is describing attack vectors,  
potential countermeasures and the the impact (downsides) those  
countermeasures might come with. Implementors will need to decide for  
themselves if and how to apply any of these techniques to their stacks.

Lars

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