[TLS] RE: Review of draft-santesson-tls-gssapi-00
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[TLS] RE: Review of draft-santesson-tls-gssapi-00
Simon Josefsson wrote:
> > I'm not sure if we really need special GSSAPI ciphersuites either...
> > But at least it would allow the client to say "I want to do
> > RSA+GSS-API, not plain RSA" in a way that would be correctly
> > understood by existing servers (that don't do GSS-API).
>
> Ok. I believe it would be a considerable advantage to avoid
> requiring new ciphersuites for GSS-API negotiation.
BTW, I'd be interested to know why, and what you consider
to be the advantages?
<snip>
> When GSS-API mechanisms are used in protected channels (such as
> TLS, possibly using a double-handshake mechanism together with
> channel bindings in the authentication) I don't see any
> cryptographic need for the authentication mechanism to also
> provide message security services. Designing messages security
> services is quite complicated, so if possible I would want to
> avoid it.
So would your suggestion be to use the GSS-API channel binding
(in GSS_Init/Accept_sec_context) instead of GSS_GetMIC/GSS_Wrap?
Is there any danger that this could allow replaying GSS tokens
from a different context where the acceptor ignores the channel
bindings (see RFC 4121, Section 7)? Or can this be addressed
by some other means?
Best regards,
Pasi
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