Re: [***SPAM*** Score/Req: 11.0/5.0] Re: [TLS] Review of draft-santesson-tls-gssapi-00
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [***SPAM*** Score/Req: 11.0/5.0] Re: [TLS] Review of draft-santesson-tls-gssapi-00



Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at secure-endpoints.com> wrote:
> Martin Rex wrote:
> > Ari Medvinsky wrote:
> >> 2) Your proposal still requires the server to have an X509 certificate;
> >> the original proposal does not have this constraint.  There are
> >> scenarios where it is desirable not require server to have an SSL cert.
> >
> > If at all, the architecture should address GSS-API in general,
> > not just specific mechanisms favoured by a few.
> >
> > SSL/TLS has been around for >10 years, so providing web servers with an
> > X.509 cert is a long solved problem.  The reason why gssapi authentication
> > is interesting is because it would allow one to authenticate clients/users
> > based on their existing (non-X.509) credentials in order to provide
> > Single Sign-On.
> >
> > Since the installed base does not yet implement a tls-gss extension
> > (heck, we don't even know what it is going to look like), we ought
> > to provide a migration path instead of a flag day, so that clients
> > that are later in supporting tls-gss can still interoperate based
> > on existing authentication schemes, and ultimately that means
> > the server ought to provide an X.509 cert for quite some time.
> >
> > -Martin
> Martin:
> 
> There is a small but significant deployed base of RFC 2712 TLS_KRB5
> implementations
> which need to migrate to something that is non-DES based.   TLS_GSS will
> provide that
> for them immediately without the need for an X.509 certificate.  They
> are not using an
> X.509 certificate with TLS_KRB5 ciphers.
> 
> A TLS_GSS using Kerberos 5 would be a transparent replacement for these
> clients and
> servers when both sides support TLS_GSS instead of TLS_KRB5.

Sure, but as we're seeing in a number of applications, this doesn't
preclude the use of self-signed certs.

-Ekr


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS at lists.ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls




Note: Messages sent to this list are the opinions of the senders and do not imply endorsement by the IETF.