Re: [TLS] Straw poll on TLS SRP status

[Yoav Nir <ynir at checkpoint.com>]

On Jun 2, 2007, at 10:08 AM, Tom Wu wrote:

> Martin Rex:
>
> > The document status is pretty much the only "incentive" that the
> > IETF can put out for companies to slow down on their patents race
> > or at least to come up with reasonable licensing terms (i.e.  
> > royalty free
> > for Free and OpenSource software).
>
> Keep in mind that in the context of this discussion, Stanford (SRP)  
> and
> Lucent (EKE) are competitors.  Knocking down TLS-SRP from Proposed to
> Informational/Experimental rewards the player that did not do the  
> "right"
> thing (free licensing) at the expense of the player that did the  
> "right"
> thing (Stanford).  The last thing you want to do is to create an  
> incentive
> for players to do an IPR "denial of service" on a competitor's  
> technology,
> since this encourages "patent race" behavior.

It's not about punishing Stanford or rewarding Lucent. It's the  
question of whether or not you might get sued for implementing this.

> Yoav Nir:
>
> > I think SRP should not be a stand-alone extension, but rather that  
> > it should be introduced as part of EAP.
>
> At the risk of being a bit blunt, if the EAP approach is so great,  
> why has
> more support grown around TLS-SRP instead?  I would also add that  
> the two
> parts of your statement are not mutually exclusive.  If you want to  
> advance
> EAP-SRP in TLS, great, but it is not a valid reason to slow down a  
> standard
> that is already in use and has seen a lot of scrutiny.
>
> > I know SRP has the capability to do the whole key exchange, but  
> > why do we need it.
>
> Perhaps we want the session to be secure against MITM attacks?

Perhaps, but we don't need to have the key mixed into the encryption  
keys of TLS. It should be good enough to have the server prove it has  
access to the SRP key.  This was the approach taken in IKEv2, and it  
should also be good for EAP-in-TLS.



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