[TLS] Issue 30: Reject RSA public exponent 1

[Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com>]

http://www3.tools.ietf.org/wg/tls/trac/ticket/30

Nelson Bolyard writes:
	Some time ago, mozilla was modified to detect and reject RSA
	keys with public exponents equal to 1.  Presumably, the
	readers of this list need no explanation of the implications
	of such keys.

	Now, mozilla users are encountering web sites whose certs have
	such keys.  At least one public CA has apparently issued one
	or more such certs.
	
	I'm reporting this here to alert the readers of this list who
	may wish to ensure that their implementations detect such
	keys, and to suggest that perhaps the TLS RFC should
	explicitly forbid the use of any public keys (RSA or
	otherwise) that facilitate such weak encryption and/or
	authentication by requiring implentations to detect and reject
	them.


My general feeling is that there are a broad category of "good crypto
practices" issues that don't apply specifically to TLS. I'd love to
see an RFC on them, but would rather not see them in TLS proper
since they need to be duplicated in every crypto-using RFC.

Proposed resolution: do nothing.

-Ekr

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