Re: [TLS] Issue 15: Mandate protection against CBC mode timing attack
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Re: [TLS] Issue 15: Mandate protection against CBC mode timing attack
On Sun, Jun 03, 2007 at 10:23:09AM -0700, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 6/3/07, Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com> wrote:
>> http://www3.tools.ietf.org/wg/tls/trac/ticket/15
>>
>> NIST's comments suggest that the defense suggested in 6.2.3.2
>> should be mandatory. My argument is that hardware systems may
>> operate in fixed time or otherwise be safe and so we shouldn't
>> mandate any particular defense.
> Perhaps we should mandate it for implementations that are vulnerable?
That's exactly what the current I-D does: "MUST ensure that record
processing time is essentially the same whether or not the padding is
correct", and "[i]n general, the best way to do this is ...".
I don't see any reason to change the wording, so:
>> Proposed resolution: leave as-is.
Bodo
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