Re: [TLS] Issue 16: Alert clarifications

[Nelson B Bolyard <nelson at bolyard.com>]

Eric Rescorla wrote:
> At Thu, 7 Jun 2007 15:33:13 +0300,
> <Pasi.Eronen at nokia.com> wrote:
>> Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>
>>> - Add a warning that some implementations tear down the connection
>>>   for any alert so warning alerts are dangerous. New implementations
>>>   SHOULD not tear down the connection for warning alerts.
>> Why not simply "MUST NOT tear down"? (this requirement would apply 
>> only when TLS 1.2 is negotiated, so what some implementations did
>> with 1.0 or 1.1 doesn't matter)
> 
> Works for me.

Umm. Some warning alerts exist to give the recipient a choice to tear
down or not.  E.g. no_renegotiation.  RFC 2246 says:

   no_renegotiation
       Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the
       server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking.
       Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that
       is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert;
       at that point, the original requester can decide whether to
       proceed with the connection. One case where this would be
       appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to
       satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters
       (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be
       difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that
       point. This message is always a warning.

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