[TLS] draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-04 available
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[TLS] draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-04 available
I just submitted draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-04.
Until it's in the repository, you can find it at:
https://svn.resiprocate.org/rep/ietf-drafts/ekr/tls/tls.txt
The changes are:
- Added some guidance about checking DH groups and exponents.
[Issues 15 and 43]
- DigestInfo now MUST be NULL but must be accepted either way
per discussion in Prague [Issue 22]
- Improved versions of Bleichenbacher/Klima/Version number
text for the EPMS (due to Eronen) [Issue 17]
- Cleaned up SSLv2 backward compatibility text [Issue 25]
- Improvements to signature hash agility text [Issue 41].
Still not completely fixed.
- Changed cert_hash_types to signature hash types and indicated a
preference order.
The two open issues I know of are:
1. There is still no requirement that any termination of the connection
be preceded by a fatal error. I indicated my reasoning in a message
last night and I haven't seen consensus for this change, nor did
I see any in the discussion in Prague. If there is a lot of
objection here I would ask Pasi to do a strawpoll.
2. There's still a handwave about how to know what hash is to be
used with a given signature algorithm. IMO it should be in the
SPKI of the relevant cert for every algorithm but RSA-PKCS1-v15
and for backward compatibility, if the cert is bare dsa it
should be SHA-1. This requires an indicator in the cert,
however, so we need to at least talk to PKIX about it, hence
the handwave.
Also, I deliberately didn't talk about issues with cert types/algorithms
not mentioned in this draft, i.e., PGP and ECC...
Also, I'm waiting for some additional text from Pasi on implementation
pitfalls.
-Ekr
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