Re: [TLS] the use cases for GSS-based TLS and the plea for integrating
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Re: [TLS] the use cases for GSS-based TLS and the plea for integrating



Leif Johansson wrote on 7/26/07 22:00 +0200:
I'd agree that implementers only want to integrate one security
services layer. But some implementers want their security services
layer and identity stack to be as cleanly separated as possible so a
tight binding between the two is not desirable.  TLS only provides
certificate-based identity today, a mechanism that is very different
from other user identity services because it does not require the TLS
stack to perform a user identity network lookup in the middle of the
TLS handshake.  Doing that means the TLS stack suddenly has to
communicate problems talking to the identity lookup service through
the TLS stack and back to the application.

Username+password has the same property right?

Yes.

Would you support a password-based scheme inside TLS or

Most schemes that embed user authentication in the TLS state machine have similar issues. Since GSSAPI is a framework for authentication mechanisms in general, it inherits the superset of all authentication-identity-related issues.


would you support removing authentication from TLS entierly?

No. Server certificate authentication is useful in practice as part of today's interim solution to authentication despite certain dubious qualities. As client certificate authentication is a rarely used feature of TLS, it's questionable whether it should have been included in the original design. However, given that the mechanism has deployed well in implementations and is actually used in some enclaves, it would be far too disruptive to change now. Client certificates are also less problematic because the identity service lookup can be deferred to the application layer using a mechanism such as SASL EXTERNAL or IMAP "* PREAUTH".


               - Chris


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