[TLS] Re: Issue 56: AES as MTI
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[TLS] Re: Issue 56: AES as MTI



Mike <mike-list at pobox.com> writes:

>> The current algorithm is 3DES_EDE_CBC. I would imagine we would use
>> AES_128_CBC. It's a much easier substitution than GCM and most
>> TLS stacks already support AES-CBC.
>
> I support AES-CBC in my implementation, but don't yet support GCM,
> just as one more data point for your decision.

The situation is the same for GnuTLS, FWIW.

> However, is 128-bit AES as strong as 192-bit 3DES?

The effective key size for 3DES is only 112 bits, see also:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_DES

/Simon

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