[TLS] draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[TLS] draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00
TLS Lists,
We wrote up revised revision RFC4132 'Camellia Cipher Suite for TLS'.
This draft include some features.
1. 256bit ciphers combined SHA-384 and SHA-512
-> Which is appropriate 256bit for security?
2. Included Camellia-CTR mode.
-> Counter mode is considered as important, as it is described in TLS
WG charter. But it hove not been specified yet.
This draft is not in I-D repository but will appear A.S.A.P after next IETF.
Comments and questions about our document would be welcome.
Regards.
--
- KATO Akihiro
+ NTT Software Corporation
Network Working Group A. Kato
Internet-Draft NTT Software Corporation
Updates: 4132 (if approved) M. Kanda
Intended status: Standards Track Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Expires: September 3, 2008 Corporation
March 2, 2008
Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS
draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 3, 2008.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
This document specifies set of cipher suites to the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia encryption algorithm
as a bulk cipher algorithm. This proposal provides options for fast
and efficient bulk cipher algorithms.
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Proposed Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Counter Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Mandatory Cipher Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Downgrade Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Counter Block Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
1. Introduction
This document proposes the addition of new cipher suites to the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] protocol to
support the Camellia encryption algorithm as a bulk cipher algorithm.
Camellia is a symmetric cipher with a Feistel structure. Camellia
was developed jointly by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation in
2000. It was designed to withstand all known cryptanalytic attacks,
and it has been scrutinized by worldwide cryptographic experts.
Camellia is suitable for implementation in software and hardware,
offering encryption speed in software and hardware implementations
that is comparable to Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[FIPS.197.2001].
Camellia supports 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key
lengths, i.e., the same interface specifications as the AES.
Therefore developers can implement Camellia based algorithms without
large amount of modification by replacing AES block of AES based
algorithms to Camellia block.
Camellia is adopted as IETF and several international standardization
organizations. Camellia is already adopted as IPsec [RFC4312], TLS
[RFC4132], S/MIME [RFC3657] and XML [RFC4051]. Camellia is adopted
for the one of three ISO/IEC international standard cipher [ISO/IEC
18033-3] as 128bit block cipher (Camellia AES and SEED). Camellia
was selected as a recommended cryptographic primitive by the EU
NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and
Encryption) project [NESSIE] and was included in the list of
cryptographic techniques for Japanese e-Government systems that was
selected by the Japan CRYPTREC (Cryptography Research Evaluation
Committees) [CRYPTREC].
Since optimized source code is provided by several open source
licences [1], Camellia is also adopted by several open source
projects (Openssl, FreeBSD, Linux and Gran Paradiso).
The algorithm specification and object identifiers are described in
[RFC3713].
The Camellia homepage [2] contains a wealth of information about
Camellia, including detailed specification, security analysis,
performance figures, reference implementation, optimized
implementation, test vectors, and intellectual property information.
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
1.1. Terminology
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" that
appear in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119] .
2. Proposed Cipher Suites
The cipher suites proposed here have the following definitions:
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x41 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x42 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x43 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x44 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x45 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x46 };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x84 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x85 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x86 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x87 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x88 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x89 };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
3. Cipher Suite Definitions
3.1. Key Exchange
The cipher suites defined here differ in the type of certificate and
key exchange method. They use the following options:
Indicator of
Cipher Suite Key Exchange Algorithm
RSA RSA
DH_DSS DH_DSS
DH_RSA DH_RSA
DHE_DSS DHE_DSS
DHE_RSA DHE_RSA
DH_anon DH_anon
For the meanings of the terms RSA, DH_DSS, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA,
and DH_anon, please refer to section 7.4.2. of
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].
3.2. Cipher
The cipher suites defined here uses different type of Mode of
Operations and key size. They use the following options:
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
Indicator of Key Expanded Effective IV Block
Cipher Suite Type Material Key Material Key Bits Size Size
CAMELLIA_128_CBC Block 16 16 128 16 16
CAMELLIA_256_CBC Block 32 32 256 16 16
CAMELLIA_128_CTR Stream 16 16 128 0 N/A
CAMELLIA_256_CTR Stream 32 32 256 0 N/A
3.3. Counter Mode
CAMELLIA_128_CTR and CAMELLIA_256_CTR are specified in
[I-D.kato-camellia-ctrccm]. Counter mode requires the encryptor and
decryptor to share a per record unique counter block. As previously
stated, a given counter block MUST never be used more than once with
the same key.
To construct the counter block, the leftmost 48-bits of the counter
block are set to the rightmost 48-bits of the client_write_IV (for
the half-duplex stream originated by the client) or the rightmost 48-
bits of the server_write_IV (for the half-duplex stream originated by
the server.) The following 64-bits of the counter block are set to
record sequence number, and the remaining 16-bits function as the
block counter. The block counter is a 16-bit unsigned integer in
network byte order (i.e. big-endien). The block counter is initially
set to one, and is incremented by one to generate subsequent counter
blocks, each resulting in another 128-bits of key stream.
Struct of counter block differ between TLS and DTLS for deffernt bit
lenght of sequence number. The structure of the counter block is
depicted below:
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
for TLS
struct {
case client:
uint48 client_write_IV; // low order 48-bits
case server:
uint48 server_write_IV; // low order 48-bits
uint64 seq_num;
uint16 blk_ctr;
} CtrBlk;
for DTLS
struct {
case client:
uint48 client_write_IV; // low order 48-bits
case server:
uint48 server_write_IV; // low order 48-bits
uint16 epoch;
uint48 seq_num;
uint16 blk_ctr;
} CtrBlk;
The seq_num and blk_ctr fields of the counter block are initialized
for each record processed, while the IV is initialized immediately
after a key calculation is made (key calculations are made whenever a
TLS/DTLS handshake, either full or abbreviated, is executed.) seq_num
is set to the sequence number of the record, and blk_ctr is
initialized to 1.
Note that the block counter does not overflow since the maximum size
of input to the record payload protection layer in TLS or DTLS
(TLSCompressed.length) is 2^14 + 1024 octets, and 16 bits of blk_ctr
allow the generation of 2^20 octets (2^16 Camellia blocks) of keying
material per record.
3.4. MAC
The cipher suites defined here uses different type of hash functions
for calucuret MAC. They use the following options:
Indicator of
Cipher Suite MAC PRF
SHA HMAC-SHA-1 P_SHA-1
SHA256 HMAC-SHA-256 P_SHA-256
SHA384 HMAC-SHA-384 P_SHA-384
SHA512 HMAC-SHA-512 P_SHA-512
TLS1.1 or earlier versions uses SHA-1/MD5 combination for PRF. When
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
server and client select cipher suites indicated by SHA in TLS1.1 or
earlier versions, PRF MUST be calclated by TLS1.1 or earlier versions
manner.
Ciphersuite indicated by SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 MUST NOT be
negotiated by TLS1.1 or earlier versions. Clients MUST NOT offer
cipher suites indicated by SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 if they do not
offer TLS 1.2 or later. Servers which select an earlier version of
TLS MUST NOT select one of cipher suites indicated by SHA256, SHA384
and SHA512.
Because TLS has no way for the client to indicate that it supports
TLS 1.2 but not earlier, a non-compliant server might potentially
negotiate TLS 1.1 or earlier and select one of the cipher suites in
this document. Clients MUST check the TLS version and generate a
fatal "illegal_parameter" alert if they detect an incorrect version.
4. Mandatory Cipher Suite
A TLS compliant application supported this specification MUST
implement the cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the following values for these cipher suites:
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x41 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x42 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x43 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x44 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x45 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x46 };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x84 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x85 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x86 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x87 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x88 };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x89 };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CTR_SHA256 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA384 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CTR_SHA512 = { TBD,TBD };
6. Security Considerations
At the time of writing this document, there are no known weak keys
for Camellia.
The security considerations in [I-D.kato-camellia-ctrccm] apply to
this document as well. The remainder of this section describes
security considerations specific to the cipher suites described in
this document.
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
6.1. Downgrade Attack
TLS negotiation is only as secure as the weakest cipher suite that is
supported. For instance, an implementation which supports both 160-
bit and 256-bit elliptic curves can be subject to an active downgrade
attack to the 160-bit security level. An attacker who can attack
that can then forge the Finished handshake check and successfully
mount a man-in-the-middle attack.
6.2. Counter Block Reuse
Counter mode is only secure if the counter is never reused. The
counter block construction algorithm above is designed to ensure that
this cannot happen.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]
Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-09
(work in progress), February 2008.
[I-D.kato-camellia-ctrccm]
Kato, A. and M. Kanda, "Camellia Counter mode and Camellia
Counter with CBC Mac mode algorithms",
draft-kato-camellia-ctrccm-00 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4132] Moriai, S., Kato, A., and M. Kanda, "Addition of Camellia
Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4132, July 2005.
7.2. Informative References
[CRYPTREC]
Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA),
"Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees",
<http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/index-e.html>.
[FIPS.197.2001]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001, <
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/
fips-197.pdf>.
[ISO/IEC 18033-3]
International Organization for Standardization,
"Information technology - Security techniques - Encryption
algorithms - Part 3: Block ciphers", ISO/IEC 18033-3,
July 2005.
[NESSIE] "The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures,
Integrity and Encryption)",
<http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/>.
[RFC3657] Moriai, S. and A. Kato, "Use of the Camellia Encryption
Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3657, January 2004.
[RFC3713] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of
the Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004.
[RFC4051] Eastlake, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource
Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 4051, April 2005.
[RFC4312] Kato, A., Moriai, S., and M. Kanda, "The Camellia Cipher
Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 4312,
December 2005.
URIs
[1] <http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/source.html>
[2] <http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/camellia/>
Authors' Addresses
Akihiro Kato
NTT Software Corporation
Phone: +81-45-212-7577
Fax: +81-45-212-9800
Email: akato at po.ntts.co.jp
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
Masayuki Kanda
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Phone: +81-422-59-3456
Fax: +81-422-59-4015
Email: kanda.masayuki at lab.ntt.co.jp
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS March 2008
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr at ietf.org.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
Kato & Kanda Expires September 3, 2008 [Page 13]
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS at ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
Note: Messages sent to this list are the opinions of the senders and do not imply endorsement by the IETF.
