[TLS] Review of draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00

[Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com>]

$Id: draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00-rev.txt,v 1.1 2008/03/04 17:32:45 ekr Exp $

It's not clear to me why this document isn't simply an updated
cut-and-paste of RFC 4132 with additional ciphers. In particular,
this draft contains a large number of grammatical errors which
have already been ironed out of 4132.

It's not clear to me that we really need the combinatoric
explosion of all possible key exchange and signature
algorithms with Camellia.

I think it's a bad idea to specify HMAC-SHA-1 for use with
the SHA-1 cipher suites. Note that all the suites in
TLS 1.2 use SHA-256.

Why do we need a mandatory to implement Camellia cipher
suite? TLS is quite capable of negotiating this stuff.



-Ekr
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