Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[Martin Rex <Martin.Rex at sap.com>]

Rob Dugal wrote:
> 
> You raise good points but by not having SHA-224 as a supported hash 
> algorithm you effectively prevent anyone from using any certificates which 
> use SHA-224 in TLS 1.2.
> If the certificate doesn't use a hash algorithm found in the 
> signature_algorithms extension then it cannot be used in TLS 1.2.

Maybe it is a good idea to use this as market pressure to
keep CAs from doing stupid things, such as issuing X.509
certificates with SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 in the signature.

(I hope that NIST didn't come up with a braindead suggestion to do so.)

-Martin
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS at ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls