Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman at vpnc.org>]

At 3:09 PM +0100 3/5/08, Martin Rex wrote:
>Rob Dugal wrote:
>>
>>  You raise good points but by not having SHA-224 as a supported hash
>>  algorithm you effectively prevent anyone from using any certificates which
>>  use SHA-224 in TLS 1.2.
>>  If the certificate doesn't use a hash algorithm found in the
>>  signature_algorithms extension then it cannot be used in TLS 1.2.
>
>Maybe it is a good idea to use this as market pressure to
>keep CAs from doing stupid things, such as issuing X.509
>certificates with SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 in the signature.

I'm with Martin on this one. The reason SHA-224 was invented was to 
have "impedance balance" with TripleDES. Even if you agree with that 
reasoning, there is no reason to use it in certificates. We don't 
need to help them here.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
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