Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[Martin Rex <Martin.Rex at sap.com>]

I want to apologize for my rude and inappropriate language in my
last message.

Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
> At 3:09 PM +0100 3/5/08, Martin Rex wrote:
> >
> >Maybe it is a good idea to use this as market pressure to
> >keep CAs from doing stupid things, such as issuing X.509
> >certificates with SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 in the signature.
> 
> I'm with Martin on this one. The reason SHA-224 was invented was to 
> have "impedance balance" with TripleDES. Even if you agree with that 
> reasoning, there is no reason to use it in certificates. We don't 
> need to help them here.

I'm perfectly fine with hash agility, and I think there is value
in truncating keyed hashes/MACs, but for a digital signature on
an X.509 certificate, using SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 looks like
additional complexity without value.

And even then, truncating a regular hash in a generic fashion,
like Eric suggested, seems IHMO to be more appropriate than
to define/add a new hash algorithm on every occasion.

-Martin


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