Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[<Pasi.Eronen at nokia.com>]

Martin Rex wrote:

> Maybe it is a good idea to use this as market pressure to
> keep CAs from doing stupid things, such as issuing X.509
> certificates with SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 in the signature.
> 
> (I hope that NIST didn't come up with a braindead suggestion 
> to do so.)

One of the four allowed parameter combinations for DSA in current 
FIPS 186-3 draft is (L=2048, N=224), which potentially (although
not necessarily) could mean SHA-224.

However, the issue at hand is not whether this is a particularly
good idea or not (probably it isn't; and you can send comments
to NIST about that).

The issue is whether we want TLS 1.2 to be as algorithm-agile as 
possible, or try to impose artificial limitations to this agility 
as "market pressure". I would support making this agile, instead
of trying to predict (or control) the future.

Best regards,
Pasi
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