Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com>]

At Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:40:29 +0200,
<Pasi.Eronen at nokia.com> wrote:
> 
> Martin Rex wrote:
> 
> > Maybe it is a good idea to use this as market pressure to
> > keep CAs from doing stupid things, such as issuing X.509
> > certificates with SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 in the signature.
> > 
> > (I hope that NIST didn't come up with a braindead suggestion 
> > to do so.)
> 
> One of the four allowed parameter combinations for DSA in current 
> FIPS 186-3 draft is (L=2048, N=224), which potentially (although
> not necessarily) could mean SHA-224.
> 
> However, the issue at hand is not whether this is a particularly
> good idea or not (probably it isn't; and you can send comments
> to NIST about that).
> 
> The issue is whether we want TLS 1.2 to be as algorithm-agile as 
> possible, or try to impose artificial limitations to this agility 
> as "market pressure". I would support making this agile, instead
> of trying to predict (or control) the future.

Regretfully, I agree with this....

-Ekr
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