Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[Mike <mike-list at pobox.com>]

>>> Maybe it is a good idea to use this as market pressure to
>>> keep CAs from doing stupid things, such as issuing X.509
>>> certificates with SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 in the signature.
>>>
>>> (I hope that NIST didn't come up with a braindead suggestion 
>>> to do so.)
>>
>> The issue is whether we want TLS 1.2 to be as algorithm-agile as 
>> possible, or try to impose artificial limitations to this agility 
>> as "market pressure". I would support making this agile, instead
>> of trying to predict (or control) the future.
> 
> Regretfully, I agree with this....

There seem to be a lot of strong feelings against SHA-224.
I looked at the FIPS amendment which defines it, and it
doesn't appear to be such a horrible thing.  Can someone
explain how NIST got it so wrong?

Thanks,

Mike
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