Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[Uri Blumenthal <uri at ll.mit.edu>]

No strong feelings. Just a reaction to an algorithm whose usefulness  
is low now and will decrease further. Compare it to SHA512 whose  
usefulness is expected to increase.
--
Regards,
Uri

On Mar 6, 2008, at 10:37 AM, Mike wrote:

> > > > Maybe it is a good idea to use this as market pressure to
> > > > keep CAs from doing stupid things, such as issuing X.509
> > > > certificates with SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 in the signature.
> > > >
> > > > (I hope that NIST didn't come up with a braindead suggestion
> > > > to do so.)
> > >
> > > The issue is whether we want TLS 1.2 to be as algorithm-agile as
> > > possible, or try to impose artificial limitations to this agility
> > > as "market pressure". I would support making this agile, instead
> > > of trying to predict (or control) the future.
> >
> > Regretfully, I agree with this....
>
> There seem to be a lot of strong feelings against SHA-224.
> I looked at the FIPS amendment which defines it, and it
> doesn't appear to be such a horrible thing.  Can someone
> explain how NIST got it so wrong?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Mike
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