Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com>]

At Thu, 06 Mar 2008 07:37:28 -0800,
Mike wrote:
> 
> >>> Maybe it is a good idea to use this as market pressure to
> >>> keep CAs from doing stupid things, such as issuing X.509
> >>> certificates with SHA-224 instead of SHA-256 in the signature.
> >>>
> >>> (I hope that NIST didn't come up with a braindead suggestion 
> >>> to do so.)
> >>
> >> The issue is whether we want TLS 1.2 to be as algorithm-agile as 
> >> possible, or try to impose artificial limitations to this agility 
> >> as "market pressure". I would support making this agile, instead
> >> of trying to predict (or control) the future.
> > 
> > Regretfully, I agree with this....
> 
> There seem to be a lot of strong feelings against SHA-224.
> I looked at the FIPS amendment which defines it, and it
> doesn't appear to be such a horrible thing.  Can someone
> explain how NIST got it so wrong?

It's not *bad*. It's just unnecessary.

-Ekr
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