Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport

[Uri Blumenthal <uri at ll.mit.edu>]

Too early. My crystal ball says - in 5 to 10 years, in the meanwhile there may be benefits in a properly truncated SHA512 variation.

--

Regards,

Uri

On Mar 10, 2008, at 1:30 PM, Rob Williams wrote:

At Thu, 06 Mar 2008 08:32:04 -0800
Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > There seem to be a lot of strong feelings against SHA-224.
> > I looked at the FIPS amendment which defines it, and it
> > doesn't appear to be such a horrible thing.  Can someone
> > explain how NIST got it so wrong?
>
> It's not *bad*. It's just unnecessary.

Agreed.

Just as SHA-224 is to SHA-256,
        SHA-384 is to SHA-512: truncated with different IV.

I am looking forward to seeing SHA-384 removed from TLS 1.2.

Thanks!<ATT00001.txt>

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