Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Informational RFC
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Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Informational RFC



Hi Dean.

It's debatable whether or not ECC is really heavily patented, considering that the original articles are from the early 80s. AFAIK all the IPR claims that may matter are from Certicom. You may have found this statement in your search: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/750/

In that disclosure, Certicom grants a license to use their IPR for ECC in all IKE, IKEv2 and TLS protocols. This may be the reason why there are no disclosure specific to this draft.

Yoav

On Jun 25, 2008, at 9:53 PM, Dean Anderson wrote:

Gentle people,

I can find no patent disclosures on this document listed on the IETF IPR
search page at https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/ using
draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac as the I-D Filename.

Elliptic curve cryptography is a heavilly patented area, and it seems
impossible that this draft does not involve an existing patent.

I also seemed to have missed the discussion of non-patented
alternatives, as required by RFC3979.

Surely the IESG would not approve a document AGAIN that did not disclose
its patent status in violation of RFC3979 et al!?!

I have to object to the approval of this draft on those grounds.  I am
very concerned that the IESG would not be more circumspect and careful
in light of the previous TLS-Authz scandal. See
http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/Housley/index.html
http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/TimPolk/index.html
for more information about TLS-Authz.

		--Dean


On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, The IESG wrote:

The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
  Counter Mode '
  <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working
Group.

The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt

Technical Summary

  This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
  specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
  SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).

Working Group Summary

  This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
  working group.

Document Quality

  There has been significant review of the document by members of
  the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
  improve the document based on these reviews.

Personnel

  The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph Salowey, and the
  responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.

RFC Editor Note

  In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"

  Abstract:
  OLD:
     However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
     algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
     for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
  NEW:
     However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
     algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
     for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.

  Section 3.1
  OLD:
     These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
     cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
     of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
     algorithms.
  NEW:
     These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
     cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
     of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
     algorithms.

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