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The more I read about SAS, the more I wonder about applicability, too.In the XMPP community we have worked on a technology for end-to-end encryption of messaging sessions (a.k.a. encryption sessions, see [1]), and it has a SAS feature, but it's not clear to me if that feature is well-specified with regard to the channel in which the SAS could be communicated (we can't use the XMPP channel, because we're trying to bootstrap that channel). In any case we have now begun investigating more seriously the use TLS for end-to-end encryption of XMPP traffic, both in the link-local case and over the typical XMPP client-server architecture (see [2], [3], and [4]). Those developers who have implemented the encrypted sessions technology think its SAS feature is nifty and would like to have that feature in the TLS-based technology as well. But as you say, the SAS would need to be communicated at least via a different channel and preferably via a trustworthy channel. Developers seem to think that communicating it via PSTN is sufficient, but doing so would mean only that an attacker would need to control two channels, not that the second channel is trustworthy. So we need to research what might function as a trustworthy channel (e.g., encrypted email).
Whether Aunt Tillie would even check the SAS (or any other credential) properly is another matter, but that's a separate topic...
Peter [1] http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0116.html [2] http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0246.html [3] http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0174.html [4] http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0247.html Eric Rescorla wrote:
As Pasi says, this is quite doable technically, but I wonder about applicability. SAS-type systems only work well if you have a trustworthy channel to use to communicate the short authenticator. What did you have in mind using for that channel? -Ekr At Wed, 30 Jul 2008 21:39:52 +0300, <Pasi.Eronen at nokia.com> wrote:There have been some earlier efforts, but AFAIK they're not actively worked on: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fischl-sipping-media-dtls-01 (Section 8.5) https://svn.resiprocate.org/rep/ietf-drafts/ekr/draft-mcgrew-tls-sas.txt You might want to contact the authors of those drafts to discuss more (well, many of them are probably subscribed to this mailing list, too :). Best regards, Pasi-----Original Message----- From: Peter Saint-Andre Sent: 29 July, 2008 23:20 To: tls at ietf.org Subject: [TLS] SAS extension?In the XMPP community we are defining a way to use TLS for end-to-end encryption. We'd love to use short authentication strings (SAS) for identity verification. As far as I can see no one has worked on a TLS extension for SAS. Is there interest in doing so? I'd be happy to help write an I-D on this topic, but I'm not a TLS or security expert so it might not be appropriate for me to lead the effort.Thanks! Peter -- Peter Saint-Andre https://stpeter.im/
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