Re: [TLS] Decryption_failed alert in TLS 1.1
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Re: [TLS] Decryption_failed alert in TLS 1.1
At Thu, 30 Apr 2009 11:41:45 +0200,
<Pasi.Eronen at nokia.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I'm going through unverified errata for various SEC area RFCs,
> and came to errata ID 117 for RFC 4346 (TLS 1.1), available
> from here:
>
> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4346
>
> Currently, Section 7.2.2 of RFC 4346 says:
>
> bad_record_mac
> This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect
> MAC. This alert also MUST be returned if an alert is sent because
> a TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an
> even multiple of the block length, or its padding values, when
> checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal.
>
> and then continues:
>
> decryption_failed
> This alert MAY be returned if a TLSCiphertext decrypted in an
> invalid way: either it wasn't an even multiple of the block
> length, or its padding values, when checked, weren't correct.
> This message is always fatal.
>
> Note: Differentiating between bad_record_mac and decryption_failed
> alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
> TLS [CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the
> bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error.
>
> These two contradict each other; it first says "bad_record_mac MUST be
> sent", but then says decryption_failed "MAY be returned", and using
> bad_record_mac is "preferable".
>
> Does anyone recall what the intent here was? Early drafts (until -09)
> said "bad_record_mac SHOULD be returned", but that was later changed
> to "MUST". Should the errata fix this to something like this?
>
> decryption_failed
> This alert was used in TLS 1.0 if a TLSCiphertext decrypted
> in an invalid way. It MUST NOT be sent in TLS 1.1.
>
> (TLS 1.2 is very clear about this; decryption_failed MUST NOT
> be sent.)
Yeah, I think we just did s/SHOULD/MUST/ and didn't remove the
corresponding MAY
-Ekr
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