Re: [TLS] Cached Info extension - Draft 01

[Stefan Santesson <stefan at aaa-sec.com>]

Because no one has presented a scenario where any attacker could benefit
from a week hash to launch any realistic attack.

The worst thing an attacker can accomplish by tampering with data exchange,
is to cause the handshake to fail, which then, in the worst scenario, will
force the parties to do a new handshake without caching.

Unless the attacker has a way to convince the parties to accept some fake
data that has never been part of a real successful handshake, then the
attacker has no way to capitalize on the fact that a collision is found.


/Stefan


On 09-07-01 9:11 AM, "Florian Weimer" <fweimer at bfk.de> wrote:

> * Stefan Santesson:
> 
>> One difficulty I have is that I don't see, and never have seen, the reason
>> to provide different levels of hash algorithms for a usage that does not
>> require a strong hash.
> 
> Why do you think this doesn't need a strong hash?