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Michael D'Errico wrote: >> Suppose that the client sent an SSLv3 ClientHello >> with client_version = 3.1 (or higher). Assuming the server supports TLS, >> then TLS will be negotiated. So when the client sends the renegotiation, >> it knows that it is safe to send extensions. The attack is prevented as >> long as the renegotiating handshake uses the extension; it is not >> necessary for the initial handshake to have used it. > > The problem is that your initial handshake *is* the renegotiation! > (from the server's point of view) I may well be confused, but: a handshake is a renegotiation if-and-only-if it is encrypted. Initial handshakes are in the clear. So there is no ambiguity, from either party's point of view, about whether a handshake is a renegotiation. -- David-Sarah Hopwood ⚥ http://davidsarah.livejournal.com
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