Re: [TLS] TLS Renegotiation - Any implications to EAP-TLS ?

[Yair Elharrar <Yair.Elharrar at audiocodes.com>]

Right. EAP-TLS wouldn't be vulnerable to this attack.

PEAP might be vulnerable (theoretically), but the attacker would gain nothing by injecting data before the tunnelled EAP.

 

 

From: tls-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf Of Zheng Kanghong
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2009 08:52
To: tls at ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] TLS Renegotiation - Any implications to EAP-TLS ?

 

Hi all,

Anyone discussed the implications of the TLS renegotiation vulnerability to EAP-TLS?

From my little understanding, it seems like EAP-TLS is not vulnerable.

• There is no application layer protocol involved when EAP-TLS is executed [Please correct me if I'm wrong].
• If client certificate authentication is required (it should), the server will always request for client certificates.
• After a successful EAP-TLS exchange, the TLS tunnel is not used; only the keying material is exported [Although the tunnel is not used, is it still present and can be used in some way? Or is there no state information stored for the EAP method after a successful EAP exchange?).
• EAP re-authentication is a new EAP exchange which is independent of the previous exchange. It is not the same as TLS renegotiation which is executed in the previous TLS tunnel.

Any comments? Thanks.
- kh

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