[TLS] Updated test server
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[TLS] Updated test server



I have updated my server at https://www.mikestoolbox.net to
support the upcoming draft from Martin Rex.  Here are the
particulars:

  - client adds a "magic" cipher suite to its list of
    cipher suites in the ClientHello message as a signal
    to the server that it supports secure renegotiation.
    the code point for testing is 0xBFFF.  the client
    MAY put the magic cipher suite anywhere in the list
    though it is RECOMMENDED that it be first to aid in
    the quick detection of patched clients by monitoring
    devices.

  - server looks for "magic" cipher suite in client's
    cipher suite list.  it may be anywhere in the list
    and the server MUST check the entire list

  - server proceeds as normal except that when composing
    the ServerHello message, the high bit of the server
    version is set to one.  this is only a signal to the
    client; the version is not changed.  notably the
    record layer version MUST NOT have the high bit set.

  - the server then adds the previous verify_data from the
    prior handshake (if any) to the running hash of the
    handshake messages.  this data MUST follow the
    ServerHello message.  the client verify_data is added
    first, followed by the server verify_data.  if this is
    an initial handshake, the data is empty, but if it is
    a renegotiation the data will be 72 bytes for SSLv3 or
    24 bytes for all versions of TLS (unless TLS 1.2 is
    used with a cipher suite that changes the default
    length of the verify_data).

  - the client checks for the top bit of the ServerHello
    version being set to 1 and if it is adds the verify_data
    from the previous handshake to the running handshake
    messages hash immediately after ServerHello. the client
    verify_data is added first followed by the server's
    verify_data.  the high bit of the version is reset to
    zero when used for the record layer version

Mike

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