Re: [TLS] TLS Protocol Version
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Re: [TLS] TLS Protocol Version



I don't know if PSK can fly in the wider Internet environment - but Peter is quite correct regarding mutual authentication and its absence when certs are used. It would be a good idea to incorporate mutual auth (assuming this protocol change could be "digested").


----- Original Message -----
From: tls-bounces at ietf.org <tls-bounces at ietf.org>
To: mrex at sap.com <mrex at sap.com>; Pasi.Eronen at nokia.com <Pasi.Eronen at nokia.com>
Cc: tls at ietf.org <tls at ietf.org>
Sent: Fri Nov 20 01:37:39 2009
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Protocol Version

<Pasi.Eronen at nokia.com> writes:

>BTW, there's another common renegotiation case where a "low-hanging fruit"
>(trivial-to-implement solution known not to cause interop problems with
>broken servers) exists: changing from server-only authentication to mutual
>authentication (with certificate-based cipher suites).

What TLS does with certificates isn't mutual authentication, it's
unidirectional authentication in both directions.  TLS-PSK provides true
mutual authentication.  So perhaps the fix is to encourage people to switch to
TLS-PSK, which as a side-effect would do a great deal to address the phishing
problem as well.

Peter.
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